The peaks of Kargil weren’t unfamiliar to Indian radar operators or military maps, but in the summer of 1999, they became something else – a hostile airspace. Between the crags and snowfields, the enemy had dug in. They had shoulder-fired missiles, high ground, and no plans to retreat. Indian Army units were climbing ridge by ridge, often under fire. Above them, in air too thin for safe flying, Indian Air Force pilots were sent in.
No one had built flight manuals for this kind of war. No one had trained for this. Flying bombing runs between jagged ridgelines at 17,000 feet, in aircraft that struggled to stay stable, let alone strike accurately. The flight paths were narrow, hostile corridors where the margin for error was the width of a wingtip, and the IAF kept flying into them.
Most of the IAF’s frontline aircraft in 1999 weren’t designed for mountain warfare. The MiG-21, a delta-winged relic from the Cold War, had neither the electronics nor the engine power for high-altitude precision strikes. The MiG-27, its variable-geometry sibling, could carry bombs but struggled with engine flameouts and poor handling at altitude. The Jaguar, made for fast, low-level ground attack over flat terrain, faced downdrafts and shifting wind corridors, it was never tested for. None had digital terrain warning systems. GPS wasn’t standard. Maps were printed out the night before. Briefings relied on handwritten notes and sketchy coordinates scribbled by soldiers on the ground.
What the IAF did have was urgency. Artillery fire alone couldn’t neutralise dug-in positions on cliff faces and narrow saddles. Infantry couldn’t advance without the air being cleared. So the Air Force flew without precision weapons in the beginning, without proper mountain flying protocols, and without illusions about the risks.
Operation Safed Sagar
The IAF launched Operation Safed Sagar in late May. Initial missions were flown using MiG-21s, MiG-27s, and Jaguars. All three aircraft types were legacy platforms. The MiG-21s had limited avionics and low payload capacity. MiG-27s suffered from frequent engine flameouts at high altitudes, especially when throttled aggressively in thin air. Jaguars were designed for low-level penetration over flat terrain, not for mountainous environments. None of these aircraft were equipped with terrain-following radar, satellite navigation, or onboard warning systems suited to mountainous flight paths.
The first wave of sorties faced difficulties in both delivery accuracy and survivability. On 27 May 1999, a MiG-27 flown by Flt Lt Nachiketa suffered an engine flameout after weapons release. He ejected and was taken prisoner. His wingman, Sqn Ldr Ahuja, remained overhead to help pinpoint the ejection location. During this process, he was targeted by a man-portable air defence system and shot down. He ejected, but was captured and later killed. The loss of both aircraft prompted a tactical reassessment.
Enemy’s Defence
Enemy defences included Stinger and Anza missiles supplied to infiltrating forces by the Pakistani Army. These were infrared-guided, shoulder-launched systems, often fired from camouflaged positions. Pilots operating at high altitude had limited reaction time. Chaff and flares were of limited use in narrow valleys with restricted escape vectors.
The IAF’s adaptation began with the deployment of Mirage-2000 aircraft from Gwalior. The Mirage platform was selected for its flight stability at high altitude, improved strike accuracy, and ability to integrate precision-guided munitions. Laser-guided bombs were introduced in limited numbers. These were paired with LITENING targeting pods, which allowed for real-time target identification, lock-on, and guidance. However, due to limited availability of laser designation equipment and pod-equipped aircraft, many targets still had to be marked manually by ground troops using visual references, smoke, or coordinates transmitted via unsecured radio.
A major strike occurred near Tiger Hill, where an enemy observation post was directing artillery fire on Indian positions. The post was not visible from standard approach vectors due to surrounding ridgelines. Mirage pilots rehearsed entry and exit paths based on topographic maps and reconnaissance photographs. The bomb release was executed within a window of a few seconds, at an altitude and angle calculated to compensate for wind drift and drop lag in thin air. The post was destroyed. This allowed Army units to begin an uphill advance within a controlled window.
Unprecedented Undefeated Unreal
Throughout the Kargil War in June and early July 1999, the IAF flew over 5,000 sorties. Most missions were conducted from Srinagar or Avantipur airbases. Flight durations averaged 25 to 30 minutes. Due to altitude constraints, aircraft operated with reduced payloads and often burned fuel at higher-than-normal rates. Engineers made field adjustments to engine performance parameters and conducted manual integrations of GPS devices in some cockpits. In many cases, pilots flew with handwritten target diagrams taped near their instrument panels.
The Mirage fleet was used for both bombing and interdiction roles. The MiG-21s provided escort and limited suppression of enemy air defence. MiG-27s were eventually phased out of deep-strike roles due to their unreliability above 15,000 feet. Jaguars were used sparingly due to thrust limitations in thin air and difficulties in weapon stabilisation over mountainous terrain.
Weather posed a persistent operational challenge. Cloud cover, crosswinds, and sudden drops in visibility occurred daily. Thermal gradients in the valleys affected flight stability. Bomb release tables had to be recalibrated based on actual performance data, since standard manuals did not account for such operating conditions. Bombers were instructed to abort missions if visual contact was lost beyond a fixed threshold, to avoid fratricide or wasted ordnance.
Against All Odds
No search-and-rescue infrastructure existed for downed pilots at that altitude during the Kargil War. Terrain made helicopter extraction unfeasible in most sectors. In case of ejection, survival probability depended entirely on location, altitude, and immediate proximity to either friendly or enemy forces. This risk was known to all participating aircrew. Nonetheless, pilots continued to fly multiple sorties per day, with mission briefs changing frequently based on inputs from forward observation teams.
By mid-July, the IAF had successfully disabled many crucial enemy positions. These included ammunition storage points, forward observation posts, communication bunkers, and high-altitude supply caches. The effect of airstrikes was not visible in terms of territory seized by the Air Force, since ground combat was led by the Army. However, air support reduced enemy artillery effectiveness, disrupted resupply routes, and cleared specific ridgelines in advance of Army assaults. In certain sectors, infantry battalions advanced within hours of airstrikes with minimal resistance.
The IAF also provided aerial reconnaissance, relaying updated topography to artillery units, many of whom were operating without digital mapping or GPS. High-resolution imagery collected by recce aircraft helped correct artillery fire and adjust assault timings. This was especially relevant in the Batalik sub-sector, where fog and snow disrupted line-of-sight targeting for ground units.
Unconventional Dominance
Operation Safed Sagar did not establish air superiority of the Indian Air Force in a conventional sense. There were no dogfights. The enemy had no air force deployed in the theatre. What was established was a high degree of air-to-ground precision in a combat environment for which no prior peacetime training had prepared the IAF. The technical limitations of existing aircraft were well known, but pilots, engineers, and planners adapted in real time. The conflict prompted a systemic re-evaluation of high-altitude combat preparedness. This resulted in the procurement of more precision weapons, upgraded avionics, and mountain-specific mission training.
The IAF’s contribution to the Kargil War is measurable not by the number of targets destroyed, but by the access it created for ground forces. Airpower enabled progress on terrain where frontal infantry assaults alone would have produced higher casualties and slower gains. In the absence of ideal platforms or guaranteed safety, Indian pilots flew calculated, disciplined missions with operational clarity. Their work supported the Army’s tactical recovery without widening the war beyond the immediate conflict zone.
