Last week, India faced one of the deadliest terror attacks on civilians in a decade. About 26 tourists, most of them Hindus, were identified by their religion and shot dead by terrorists belonging to Pakistan-backed The Resistance Front. The terror outfit is an offshoot of Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba. The incident triggered heavy tension between the two nuclear-armed nations. The Indus Water Treaty was suspended and ceasefire violated at the Line of Control (LoC), along with other developments further escalating tensions.
India is still recovering from the gruesome attack, which is when an unexpected voice from across the eastern border sparks concern in New Delhi. ALM Fazlur Rahman, a retired Bangladeshi major general and close aide to interim Bangladeshi chief adviser Muhammad Yunus, made a provocative statement: “If India retaliated against Pakistan for the attack, Bangladesh should consider ‘occupying’ India’s northeastern states.”
While the comment came from a retired officer, his proximity to the interim regime and the broader political tone emerging from Dhaka turned what might have been dismissed as rhetorical excess into a subject of urgent scrutiny.
The statement did not emerge in a vacuum. It came against the backdrop of worsening India-Bangladesh ties following the ousting of Sheikh Hasina and the installation of a Beijing-backed interim government led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus. Yunus’s own rhetoric has added fuel to the fire. During a high-profile visit to China, he described India’s northeastern states as landlocked and in need of maritime access via Bangladesh. In a remark that drew strong rebukes from Indian leaders, he referred to Bangladesh as the “natural guardian” of these states.
The developments have set off alarm bells across India’s strategic establishment. For decades, Bangladesh was seen as a partner in stability, particularly under the Hasina government, which actively cracked down on anti-India insurgent groups operating from its soil. But the new political dispensation in Dhaka appears to be reversing that trajectory, emboldened by growing Chinese influence and perhaps sensing an opportunity to assert regional power.
The Geography of Vulnerability
A two-front war has always been a concern to India. While a traditional rival, Pakistan, has already fought three wars with India, the relations with China have also been like a sitcom’s on-and-off romance leads. Pakistan on the western front and China on the north and northeastern front have always bothered India. But it did enjoy amicable relations with erstwhile East Pakistan, which it helped turn into Bangladesh. And now, even that hangs in the balance.
India’s northeast has always been a geopolitical puzzle. Connected to the rest of the country by the narrow Siliguri Corridor, often called the Chicken’s Neck, the region is strategically fragile. Just 22 kilometres wide at its narrowest point, the corridor is the only land link between the seven northeastern states and the Indian mainland.
Any talk of hostile military manoeuvres by a neighbouring country in the east, however hypothetical, strikes at the heart of Indian national security. The memory of the 1962 war with China, during which Indian positions in Arunachal Pradesh were overrun, is still alive in Indian military thinking. The idea that a coordinated threat could emerge simultaneously from the west, the north and the east, with Chinese influence over Bangladesh growing, is no longer just an academic scenario.
China’s Expanding Shadow
Bangladesh’s pivot toward China has been growing steadily over the past decade. From infrastructure investments under the Belt and Road Initiative to defence cooperation, Beijing has been cultivating deep ties with Dhaka. Chinese naval presence at the Chittagong port, while officially denied, has long been speculated. Chinese investments in roads and rail that lead right up to the Indian border have only deepened suspicions in New Delhi.
The recent political developments in Bangladesh suggest that China’s influence has crossed from economics into policymaking. With Sheikh Hasina’s exit and Yunus’s emergence as a pro-China figurehead, Indian analysts fear a shift in Dhaka’s strategic posture. The comments by Yunus and his advisers may be testing waters, trying to signal a new era of assertiveness backed by China’s growing clout in South Asia.
Northeast India Reacts
The response in India’s northeast has been swift and sharp. Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma called Rahman’s comments “deeply offensive and provocatively hostile.” In a press conference, he warned that any threat to the sovereignty of the region would be met with firm resistance. Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh leaders echoed similar sentiments, highlighting the cultural and civilizational ties the region shares with the rest of India.
Security analysts have noted that the timing of these remarks could not be worse. Northeast India has been relatively calm in recent years following decades of insurgency. Groups like the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-IM), the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), and others had seen declining influence, partly due to cooperation between India and Bangladesh on counterinsurgency efforts. A reversal in Dhaka’s stance could create safe havens once again.
The Siliguri Corridor Dilemma
The Chicken’s Neck has always been India’s most sensitive chokepoint. In strategic war games, this corridor is frequently cited as India’s Achilles’ heel. Any disruption to this land link, whether by sabotage or through a joint military pincer from China in the north and a hostile Bangladesh in the east, could isolate the entire northeast.
India has invested heavily in improving connectivity through the region, including road and rail networks, bridges across the Brahmaputra, and new infrastructure projects under the Act East policy. However, the region’s terrain remains challenging, and strategic redundancy is limited.
Recent reports indicate that the Indian Army has increased surveillance and mobility assets in the corridor, while the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) and the Border Security Force (BSF) have ramped up patrols. While there is no immediate threat of conflict, India is clearly not taking any chances.
The Hasina Factor
One of the lesser-reported developments of the past few weeks is the asylum granted by India to former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. After being unceremoniously removed from office, Hasina reportedly sought refuge in India under quiet diplomatic arrangements. Her presence is a political thorn in the side of the interim government in Dhaka, which sees her as a rallying figure for pro-India sentiment.
Indian officials have maintained a studied silence on Hasina’s status, but sources indicate she has been in contact with top Indian policymakers. Her possible re-entry into Bangladeshi politics, backed by sections of the Awami League and civil society, could destabilise the Yunus government, especially if popular sentiment begins to shift.
Strategic Calculations and Diplomatic Moves
India has taken a multi-pronged approach to managing the emerging threat. Diplomatically, it has engaged with partners in BIMSTEC and the ASEAN to reaffirm the importance of regional stability. Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar has underscored the importance of connectivity in the northeast, positioning it not just as a frontier but as a hub for transnational commerce.
At the United Nations, India has begun highlighting the destabilising rhetoric coming from Dhaka, aiming to build a narrative that frames the Yunus regime as irresponsible and erratic. Meanwhile, backchannel talks with the United States and Japan have explored possibilities of reinforcing joint monitoring in the Bay of Bengal and greater intelligence-sharing regarding activities in Bangladesh.
Could Bangladesh Really Pose a Military Threat?
On paper, Bangladesh’s military cannot match India’s conventional forces. Its army, air force, and navy are designed for defensive operations. However, the concern is less about outright war and more about the three-front war and hybrid tactics. Bangladesh could, under Chinese encouragement, offer logistical or covert support to insurgent groups, interfere with cross-border infrastructure, or engage in coordinated disinformation campaigns targeting the northeast.
Even more worrying is the possibility of low-intensity conflict or orchestrated border incidents that escalate quickly. If China and Bangladesh were to coordinate military exercises near Indian borders, it could force India to divert critical military resources, especially at a time when tensions with Pakistan are already high following the Pahalgam attack.
Building Resilience in the East
The Indian government has already taken steps to strengthen defence readiness in the northeast. The Agnipath recruitment scheme has focused on raising new units with cultural and linguistic familiarity with the region. Several new roads and airstrips have been fast-tracked in Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, and Nagaland.
There is also a renewed push to deepen engagement with civil society groups in the northeast, ensuring that developmental gains are not lost to political propaganda or disinformation. Ministries dealing with tribal affairs, environment, and rural development have been tasked with accelerating welfare schemes.
On the military front, the Eastern Command has revised contingency plans and begun joint exercises with Bhutan and Nepalese observers. This is a signal to the broader region that India is actively engaging all its eastern neighbours except Bangladesh.
The Need for Constant Vigilance
The situation with Bangladesh is not yet a crisis, but it is a flashing warning light. The northeast has historically been treated as India’s periphery, but it is rapidly becoming central to the country’s strategic calculus. The statements from Dhaka, however outlandish they may appear, reflect a new kind of geopolitical assertiveness that India must take seriously.
The northeast is no longer just a borderland. It is a test case for India’s internal cohesion, strategic infrastructure, and foreign policy agility. Ensuring its security requires not just military strength, but sustained political attention, regional diplomacy, and community engagement.
As India watches Pakistan and China, it must now keep a sharper eye on Dhaka. The threat may not be one of invasion, but one of infiltration of ideas, influence, and instability. The game in the East has changed. And India must play to win.
