In the past one week, Israel found itself facing an unprecedented threat from Iran. Earlier in June, Israel struck deep into Iran to cripple what it said were fast-advancing nuclear weapons sites and underground missile facilities. After months of rising proxy attacks and intelligence leaks about Iranian hypersonic capabilities nearing deployment, Tel Aviv decided to act preemptively. The operation was not announced. It roared to life overnight, catching much of the world off guard and dragging the region into its most direct Israel–Iran confrontation yet.
What began as a limited series of Israeli airstrikes on suspected Iranian missile infrastructure spiralled into a regional showdown. Iran responded with a wave of over 1,000 airborne threats. These included ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones, launched directly from its own territory and through its regional proxies. The assault marked the first time Iran struck Israel on such a scale in a single coordinated attack.
As the world watched, one question surfaced repeatedly: What happened to the famed Iron Dome of Israel?
Iron Dome
The Iron Dome is Israel’s most well-known missile defence system, developed to intercept and destroy short-range rockets, artillery shells, and mortars before they can hit populated areas. Jointly created by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems and Israel Aerospace Industries, it was deployed in 2011, initially to defend against rocket fire by Hamas from Gaza. Since then, it has become a symbol of Israel’s layered defence approach.
What sets Iron Dome apart is its selective engagement. Using radar and advanced tracking software, it quickly calculates the trajectory of incoming projectiles. If a rocket is projected to strike a populated area or critical infrastructure, the system fires a Tamir interceptor to destroy it mid-air. If the projectile is headed toward an open field or the sea, it is ignored, conserving costly interceptors.
Each Iron Dome battery includes a radar unit, a command-and-control system, and multiple missile launchers. It has proven effective in urban warfare conditions, particularly in southern Israel, where it has intercepted thousands of rockets with a claimed success rate of over 90%.
Iron Dome is designed for short-range threats, typically up to 70 kilometres, extended in newer versions to around 100. It is not effective against longer-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, or high-speed aerial threats.
The Limitations
The Iron Dome has earned global recognition for its effectiveness in intercepting rockets fired from Gaza and southern Lebanon. It is fast, agile, and intelligent, designed to assess incoming trajectories and only engage those projectiles that threaten population centres. But the system has always had a specific job: to defend against short-range threats, typically within 70 to 100 kilometres.
In this conflict, Iran deployed weapons far beyond that scope. Its arsenal included medium- and long-range ballistic missiles, many of them travelling at hypersonic speeds and launched from over 1,000 kilometres away. The Iron Dome was never built to handle such threats. It does not have the range, the altitude envelope, or the kinetic speed to intercept them. To expect it to perform against ballistic missiles is to ask a marksman’s rifle to shoot down a satellite.
The Bigger Shield: Israel’s Multi-Layered Defence
What did protect Israel during those intense hours were its other, less famous, but more strategically vital defensive systems. Arrow-3 intercepted threats outside Earth’s atmosphere. Arrow-2 was tasked with ballistic missiles inside the atmosphere. David’s Sling filled the gap between medium-range threats and low-flying cruise missiles. Together, these systems form the deeper layers of Israel’s missile defence doctrine.
During the Iranian assault, the Arrow systems reportedly took out ballistic missiles mid-flight, while David’s Sling and Israeli fighter jets engaged cruise missiles and drones. Even before many threats reached Israeli airspace, coalition forces, particularly the United States, Britain, and Jordan, intercepted dozens of them with Patriots, Aegis systems, and air superiority fighters operating from regional bases.
The Iron Dome was engaged only where necessary, such as in southern and northern regions where short-range rocket fire and drones were also part of the attack. And even then, it acted selectively. It intercepted only where the projected threat justified the cost.
A Technical Failure or a Strategic One?
The Iron Dome didn’t fail in this war. It wasn’t asked to do something it couldn’t do. Instead, what the conflict exposed was a persistent misconception: that Iron Dome is a cure-all for aerial threats. It never was.
But the challenge is also strategic along with technical. Iran’s approach in June was to saturate Israeli defences through numbers, complexity, and timing. Ballistic missiles were mixed with loitering munitions, drones flew in waves from multiple directions, and decoys were likely inserted to confuse radars. Some systems were reportedly equipped with jamming devices to disrupt guidance systems.
Even the most advanced integrated defence networks cannot respond perfectly to such an assault. A few missiles did get through. Some struck open areas; a few caused damage in urban centres. But the scale of destruction that could have occurred was largely avoided thanks to the deeper architecture of Israeli and allied defences. That should be seen as a success, even if it didn’t involve the Iron Dome directly.
Is Israel Deliberately Letting Some Missiles Through?
Israel is reportedly facing a shortage of its long-range Arrow missile interceptors, according to The Wall Street Journal, which cited a U.S. official. The situation has raised concerns about Israel’s ability to continue countering incoming ballistic missiles from Iran.
The report said that the U.S. has been aware of the interceptor shortage for months and has been working to strengthen Israel’s air defence. However, U.S. stockpiles are also limited. Officials are now reportedly concerned about depleting U.S. reserves while supporting Israel.
A report added that some intelligence assessments suggest Israel can continue defending against the barrage for another 10–12 days at the current pace. After that, U.S. resupply or further intervention may become necessary.
One source familiar with both U.S. and Israeli intelligence said that Israel needs to prioritise which threats to intercept, acknowledging that the system is already overloaded.
Israel’s defence strategy has long included allowing missiles aimed at uninhabited areas to go unchallenged to preserve interceptors. But now, amid heavy and frequent attacks, the country is reportedly struggling to intercept all missiles. Some of these missiles include those headed for population centres or critical infrastructure.
While Israeli military officials have not commented on the reports, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) said it remains “prepared and ready to handle any scenario,” though it declined to discuss specifics on munitions.
The Economics of Interception
Another factor often overlooked in popular commentary is cost. A single Tamir interceptor used in the Iron Dome costs tens of thousands of dollars. Iranian drones, by comparison, may cost under $10,000. Even if the Dome could physically intercept them all, the economics would not favour such a response.
The June conflict underscored this tension. Israel had to be selective in what it shot down, when, and with what system. It relied more heavily on fighter aircraft and regional partnerships than ever before. Reports also suggest that the rate of interceptor usage, particularly for Arrow systems, put significant pressure on munitions stockpiles, prompting emergency discussions with the United States about resupply.
A New Era of Threats
What Iran demonstrated in June 2025 wasn’t just a capacity for large-scale retaliation. It showcased an ability to orchestrate a modern, multi-domain strike using diverse tools. These include hypersonics, loitering drones, cruise missiles, and conventional rockets, in a single, integrated battle plan. This isn’t the kind of threat Iron Dome was built for. It’s the kind that tests the entire defensive ecosystem.
In that ecosystem, Iron Dome remains relevant, crucially so, for defending against lower-end threats that continue to emerge from Hezbollah and Hamas. But it is no longer the poster child of Israel’s air defence. That title has shifted to the Arrow family, and increasingly, to the multinational security architecture that surrounds Israel in the region.
Recalibrate Expectations
The Iron Dome still works. It still saves lives. But it was never meant to protect Israel from a direct Iranian missile barrage involving high-speed, long-range projectiles and coordinated drone warfare. This war didn’t expose a flaw in the system; it exposed a flaw in perception. It was built for a consistent but short threat of Hamas rockets. It’s like abusing the architect for building 2 bathrooms only when at a time the whole house of 6 members got diarrhoea.
As threats evolve, so too must public understanding. The Iron Dome was always one part of a larger strategy. In June 2025, that strategy was tested like never before. The results were not perfect, but they were proof that Israel’s defence isn’t just resting on a dome. It’s standing on a far more complex and interdependent foundation.
