In May 2020, an Indian surveillance aircraft picked up an unusual sight in the Andaman Sea: three Chinese warships, led by a guided-missile destroyer, moving through the Malacca Strait. This wasn’t a rare occurrence anymore. Over the past decade, China’s warships, submarines, and research vessels became frequent visitors in the Indian Ocean. Beijing claimed they were there for “anti-piracy operations” and “scientific research.” But intelligence reports told a different story.
Chinese submarines had been quietly mapping the ocean floor, collecting data critical for future military operations. Its warships were docking at ports across South Asia—Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Gwadar in Pakistan, and Kyaukpyu in Myanmar—turning what were once commercial projects into de facto naval outposts. In 2017, China opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti, just off a critical chokepoint for global trade. The message was clear: the Indian Ocean was no longer just India’s domain.
For India, this was a wake-up call. If it wanted to maintain dominance in the waters it had long considered its backyard, it needed to act fast. The Indian Navy was already stretched thin, relying on ageing warships and an underdeveloped submarine fleet. Meanwhile, China was churning out destroyers, aircraft carriers, and nuclear-powered submarines at a pace unmatched by any navy except the United States.
So, the question is: Can India’s naval expansion keep up with China’s growing maritime presence, or is it already too late?
China’s Naval Expansion
For decades, China’s military strategy was largely focused on securing its eastern seaboard, where it faced potential confrontations with Taiwan, Japan, and the US Pacific fleet. However, over the past fifteen years, Beijing has expanded its ambitions westward, making inroads into the Indian Ocean. This shift has been marked by a series of strategic investments in ports, military bases, and naval deployments, effectively challenging India’s historical presence in the region.
One of the most important moves in this expansion was the establishment of a military base in Djibouti in 2017. Situated near the Bab el Mandeb Strait, a crucial chokepoint for global shipping, this base provides China with a permanent military presence in the western Indian Ocean. Around the same time, China secured a 99-year lease on Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port after the island nation struggled to repay its debts. While officially designated as a commercial facility, its infrastructure allows for potential military use, raising concerns in New Delhi. Further west, the Gwadar Port in Pakistan has emerged as another key asset for China, offering a deep-sea facility that could serve as a refuelling and repair hub for Chinese warships operating in the Arabian Sea. To the east, Beijing has also strengthened its position in Myanmar with the development of the Kyaukpyu Port, enhancing its access to the Bay of Bengal and increasing its proximity to India’s eastern coastline.
Beyond securing these strategic footholds, China has been actively deploying intelligence-gathering ships and submarines to conduct detailed mapping of the Indian Ocean’s seabed. This data is critical for naval operations, particularly submarine warfare, as it enables Chinese vessels to navigate more effectively while making detection by adversaries more difficult.
China’s naval buildup has accelerated at an unprecedented pace. Over the past decade, it has constructed two aircraft carriers, with a third currently in development. It has also significantly expanded its surface fleet, adding more than fifty modern destroyers and frigates equipped with long-range missile systems. Perhaps more concerning for India is the rapid growth of China’s nuclear-powered submarine fleet, which has the capability to remain submerged for extended periods, giving it a considerable advantage in undersea warfare.
With this aggressive expansion, the People’s Liberation Army Navy is projected to operate around 460 warships by 2030, making it the largest navy in the world. In contrast, the Indian Navy, despite its modernisation efforts, currently has approximately 130 combat vessels and aims to increase this number to 170 or 180 over the same period. The disparity between the two forces continues to widen, raising questions about whether India can keep pace with China’s growing influence in the Indian Ocean.
Can the Indian Navy Catch Up?
India is steadily working to expand its naval capabilities, particularly in the areas of aircraft carriers, submarines, surface warships, and naval infrastructure. At present, the country operates two aircraft carriers—INS Vikramaditya, a modified Russian-built carrier, and INS Vikrant, the first indigenously constructed aircraft carrier, commissioned in 2022. The Navy has long sought to add a third carrier, INS Vishal, which is envisioned to be a significantly larger and more advanced vessel. However, financial constraints have delayed its progress. Meanwhile, China has been expanding its carrier fleet at a rapid pace, with its third carrier, Fujian, under construction. Unlike India’s existing carriers, Fujian features an advanced electromagnetic catapult system, enabling it to launch heavier aircraft with greater efficiency.
India’s submarine fleet remains a key vulnerability. It currently consists of sixteen operational submarines, including both nuclear-powered and diesel-electric variants. The fleet includes INS Arihant, the country’s first indigenous nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine. To bolster its underwater warfare capabilities, India has announced plans to construct six additional attack submarines under Project 75I. In contrast, China possesses more than sixty submarines, including at least twelve nuclear-powered ones, significantly outmatching India in this domain.
Recognising the need for a stronger surface fleet, India has initiated several modernisation projects. These include the Next-Generation Missile Vessels, designed for high-speed and precision strikes, as well as Project 15B destroyers, which are advanced guided-missile warships exemplified by INS Visakhapatnam. Additionally, India is constructing new stealth frigates under Project 17A, equipping them with state-of-the-art radar and weapon systems.
To support its growing fleet, India is also enhancing its naval infrastructure. INS Kadamba, located in Karwar, is the country’s largest naval base and is being expanded to accommodate forty to forty-five warships. On the eastern coast, INS Varsha, a highly classified submarine base, is being developed to house India’s nuclear-powered submarines, further strengthening the Navy’s strategic capabilities.
India’s Counter to China’s Maritime Presence
India’s naval strategy isn’t just about building more ships—it’s about building stronger alliances. In the contest for influence in the Indian Ocean, New Delhi is increasingly turning to key partners to counter China’s growing presence. This shift is most visible in its expanding role within the Quad, an alliance of India, the United States, Japan, and Australia. Joint naval exercises, such as Malabar, have become more frequent and complex, involving aircraft carriers, submarines, and long-range patrol aircraft. These drills are not just symbolic; they train Indian forces to operate alongside some of the world’s most advanced navies, enhancing interoperability and joint operational planning in case of a future maritime crisis.
Beyond the Quad, India is strengthening its partnership with France, a country with a longstanding naval presence in the Indian Ocean through its overseas territories like Réunion. France has emerged as a key defence supplier to India, particularly in the submarine and aircraft sectors. More importantly, joint naval exercises between the two countries have deepened in recent years, reinforcing India’s ability to coordinate operations in the region. The relationship extends beyond drills—France has granted India access to its military facilities in the Indian Ocean, allowing Indian warships to refuel and resupply.
India has also quietly secured access to critical naval outposts through bilateral agreements with Seychelles, Oman, and Mauritius. These agreements allow Indian warships to use key ports, effectively extending their operational reach across the Indian Ocean. In March 2025, Prime Minister Narendra Modi further underscored India’s regional ambitions by backing Mauritius’ claim over the Chagos Archipelago. This move wasn’t just diplomatic; it signalled India’s intent to push back against China’s influence in a region where Beijing has been steadily expanding its reach. The message was clear—India isn’t willing to cede ground in its own backyard.
Where India Still Falls Behind
Budget Constraints: Unlike China, which pours billions into naval expansion, India’s defence budget is stretched across multiple fronts (Army, Air Force, and Navy).
Slow Shipbuilding Process: India’s warship production is plagued by delays. The INS Vikrant, for example, took 17 years to be commissioned.
Technological Gaps: China’s advancements in hypersonic missiles, AI-driven warfare, and drone technology give it an edge in naval combat.
Can India Hold Its Own in the Indian Ocean?
India’s navy is undergoing rapid modernisation, but it is still playing catch-up. While India remains the dominant power in the Indian Ocean today, China’s economic and military investments in the region pose a long-term challenge. The gap between the two navies is widening, and unless India significantly accelerates its naval expansion, it risks losing strategic control over waters it has long considered its own.
The next decade will determine whether India can transform its navy into a true blue-water force—or whether the Indian Ocean, once India’s domain, will slip further under Beijing’s influence.
